Growth pressure, stimulus plan and industrial land transfer*


YANG Jidong;YANG Qijing


Center for Firm and Organization Studies, School of Economics, Renmin University of China;Center for Firm and Organization Studies, School of Economics, Renmin University of China


Under China’s special decentralization system, the macroeconomic policy of the central government must depend on the cooperation of local governments mastering a large quantity of economic and administrative resources. To explore the transmission mechanism of China’s macroeconomic policy, the paper analyzes how the “four-trillion-yuan” economic stimulus plan influenced China’s urban industrial land transfer by using the difference-in-differences method based on the data of China’s urban industrial land transferred from 2007 to 2011. The results show that, (1) the growth pressure may drive the municipal governments to use the stimulus plan more actively to transfer more industrial land, but the fiscal pressure may restrict them from utilizing this plan; (2) when and only when the central loose macro policies are implemented could the municipal governments with huger growth pressure transfer more industrial land compared with other ones; and (3) if the secretaries of municipal Party committee have a longer term of office, especially more than 3 years, it will drive the municipal governments facing large growth pressure to transfer more industrial land under the stimulus plan. These empirical results suggest that the promotion competition pressure based on economic growth performance is an important driver for local governments to introduce investment and develop local economies, producing a complex interactive impact on China’s macroeconomic policy effects and economic fluctuations.


stimulus plan;economic pressure;industrial land transfer


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Total: 20 articles

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